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NOTE
An Administrative Meter Maid:
Using Inter Partes Review and Post-Grant Review
to Curb Exclusivity Parking via the “Failure to
Market” Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act
Brian T. Apel*
Congress created the unique Hatch-Waxman framework in 1984 to increase
the availability of low-cost generic drugs while preserving patent incentives for
new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act rewards generic drug companies that successfully challenge a pharmaceutical patent: 180 days of market
exclusivity before any other generic firm can enter the market. When a generic
firm obtains this reward, sometimes drug developers agree to pay generic firms
to delay entering the market. These pay-for-delay agreements give rise to exclusivity parking and run counter to congressional intent by delaying full generic drug competition. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act created several statutory forfeiture provisions that proved
only marginally effective at curbing the practice of exclusivity parking. More
recently, Congress created new quasi-judicial administrative proceedings that
effectively replace certain kinds of district court patent litigation. This Note
describes the complex statutory scheme that gave rise to exclusivity parking,
explains why previous and current attempts to curtail exclusivity parking were
and remain ineffective, and suggests amending the “failure to market” provision to include these new administrative proceedings as a way to help curb
exclusivity parking.
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Introduction
Legal protections that affect pharmaceutical drug prices involve a tale of
two competing interests: innovation and competition.1 Pharmaceutical drug
developers need to recoup large up-front development costs through abovecost pricing. On the other hand, lower pricing from greater competition
would increase consumers’ access to current drugs but would diminish investment returns and curtail the development of new drugs.2 Congress attempted to balance these competing interests in 1984 when it enacted the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,3 more commonly
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.4 Congress designed the Act to increase
access to drugs at competitive prices.5 At the same time, the Hatch-Waxman
Act fortified the incentives of “pioneers”—pharmaceutical companies that
research, create, and market new drugs—by extending the term of pharmaceutical patents. Pioneers rely on patent protection for new drugs (as well as
methods of making and using new drugs) to help recoup the cost of developing the drug and to finance future drug development.6 Although issued
patents enjoy a presumption of validity,7—that is, compliance with the patent laws—it is not uncommon for courts to determine that some patents are
1. See generally Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 Food & Drug L.J. 417 (2011)
(discussing how the Hatch-Waxman Act serves competing interests).
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
4. The Act is named for two of the statute’s sponsors: Sen. Orrin Hatch and Rep. Henry
Waxman.
5. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., RS21129,
Pharmaceutical Patent Term Extensions: A Brief Explanation 1 (2002), http://
www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS21129.pdf.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
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invalid in the course of patent infringement litigation.8 Congress was concerned that potentially invalid patents might be blocking generic entry into
certain drug markets.9 To address this concern, Congress created an incentive for generic firms to challenge pioneer patents as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act: the first generic firm to initiate and lawfully maintain a challenge
to a pioneer patent (a “first filer”) receives 180 days of market exclusivity,
enforced by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).10 Effectively,
Congress was willing to give the first filer a 180-day head start before it
would face competition from other generics in order to promote patent
challenges.11
This scheme created an unintended consequence: “exclusivity parking.”
Exclusivity parking occurs when a first filer that can otherwise enter the
market refrains from doing so. Because of the statutory scheme, no other
generic firm can enter the market until after the first filer’s 180-day market
exclusivity elapses.12 Exclusivity parking became common in the context of
patent litigation settlement agreements between the pioneer and the first
filer. Specifically, the pioneer would pay the first filer to delay entering the
market, allowing the pioneer to charge above-cost prices for a longer period
of time than if the first filer prevailed in the litigation. These types of settlements are known as “pay-for-delay” settlements.
Delaying full generic competition more than 180 days upsets the balance
Congress sought to achieve with the Hatch-Waxman Act and delays full generic competition and the lower prices that necessarily follow. Naturally,
other generic firms waiting to enter the market became frustrated with first
filers parking their exclusivity. In 2003, Congress attempted to remedy the
situation with several amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act.13 Effectively,
Congress wanted the first filer to use it or lose it. One of these amendments,
the “failure to market” provision, is triggered if the first filer or any other
generic firm waiting to enter the market prevails in litigation against the pioneer.14 Unfortunately, the failure to market provision was poorly drafted and
has proven toothless.15 Today, other generics frequently lack the incentive to
incur litigation costs to attempt to unpark the first filer, and exclusivity
parking continues largely unaffected.16
8. See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 966, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 741 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Novo Nordisk A/S v.
Caraco Pharm. Labs., 775 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1018 (E.D. Mich. 2011), aff’d in relevant part, 719
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
9. See infra Section I.A.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
11. See infra Section I.A.
12. See infra Section I.A.
13. See infra Section I.A.
14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
15. See infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text.
16. See FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions 1 (2010) [hereinafter FTC, Pay-for-Delay], http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu
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In 2011, Congress enacted major reforms to the patent laws when it
passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).17 Among its many provisions, the AIA created several quasi-judicial administrative proceedings in
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that permit a party to challenge
the validity of a duly issued patent.18 These proceedings present patent challengers, including generic firms, with alternatives to litigation. This Note
focuses on two of the AIA’s new administrative proceedings—inter partes
review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR)—and addresses a question the
AIA did not answer: Can a party that prevails in one of these proceedings
trigger the failure to market provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act, thereby
unparking the first filer’s exclusivity?
No court or agency has addressed this question.19 This Note argues that
IPRs and PGRs, as alternatives to litigation, can and should trigger the failure to market provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Because neither the FDA
nor a court is likely to construe the Hatch-Waxman Act’s language broadly
enough to incorporate IPRs and PGRs, however,20 the failure to market provision requires an amendment. Part I explains the complex statutory and
administrative structures that govern pharmaceutical patents and the circumstances that gave rise to the practice of exclusivity parking. Part II shows
that past and current attempts to eliminate exclusivity parking have been
ineffective. Part III argues that IPRs and PGRs present workable alternative
forums to challenge a patent’s validity, and that Congress should incorporate IPRs and PGRs into the Hatch-Waxman framework with a simple statutory amendment.
I. The Statutory Framework
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a detailed statutory and regulatory
framework that attempts to balance the incentives of the patent system with
the benefits of easier generic drug entry. Section I.A describes the unique
features of pharmaceutical patents and lays out the relevant portions of the
Hatch-Waxman framework as it exists today. Section I.B describes the new
administrative proceedings created by the AIA.

ments/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-tradecommission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
17. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
18. See infra Section I.B.
19. See infra notes 177–180 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Section III.B.
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A. Pharmaceutical Patents and The Hatch-Waxman Act
Due to the high cost of drug development,21 the pharmaceutical industry heavily relies on the patent system as part of its business model.22
Because the patent laws prohibit an inventor from obtaining a patent on an
invention that is used more than one year before the inventor applies for the
patent,23 drug developers must often obtain a patent on a new drug well
before FDA approval,24 which can take up to twelve years.25 Thus, while the
standard patent term is twenty years,26 “the effective patent term [for
pharmaceuticals] is frequently less than 20 years because patents are often
obtained before products are actually marketed.”27
Before 1984, companies seeking to market generic versions of previously
approved drugs were required to complete the same safety and efficacy testing in clinical trials as the pioneer drug developer.28 Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, approximately 150 pioneer drugs with expired patents had no
generic equivalent.29 Consequently, pioneer drug developers could continue
to charge above-cost prices beyond the term of the drug’s patent because the
pioneer drug did not face any direct competition.30 By comparison, once a
drug is no longer patent protected, consumers can purchase generic drugs
that can cost up to 85 percent less than the branded drug.31 Substituting
generic drugs for pioneer drugs reduces government spending on health

21. Shein-Chung Chow & Jen-Pei Liu, Design and Analysis of Clinical Trials:
Concepts and Methodologies 5 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that drug development can cost up
to $1 billion per drug).
22. See Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 93 (2004).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
24. E.g., Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
25. Chow & Liu, supra note 21, at 5.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
27. Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions on the Patent Term Restoration
Program, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069959.htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2009) (emphasis added).
28. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984).
29. David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to
Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics
and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 Food & Drug L.J. 143, 168–69 (2005).
30. See id.
31. See Facts About Generic Drugs, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggenericdrugs/ucm167991.htm (last updated
Sept. 19, 2012). This assumes, however, full generic competition. See Generic Competition and
Drug Prices, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsand
Tobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2010).
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care32 and could mean the difference between a five dollar and a twenty
dollar copay on prescription drugs for consumers.33
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,34
colloquially referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act,35 was a landmark piece of
legislation intended to make low-cost generic drugs more readily available.36
In particular, the Act significantly reduced generic firms’ entry barriers
through the creation of the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).37
By utilizing an ANDA, a generic firm is not required to submit detailed
clinical trial data to demonstrate the drug’s safety and efficacy.38 Instead, a
generic firm utilizing an ANDA must certify that its drug will have the same
active ingredients, dosage, strength, form, and packaging as the already approved pioneer drug39 (also known as “reference listed drug” or “RLD”).40
The firm must also demonstrate that its generic drug is “bioequivalent” to
the RLD by having similar chemical interactions in the human body as the
RLD.41
Because ANDAs effectively allow generic firms to “piggyback[ ]” or
“short-cut” the extensive clinical trial work financed by the pioneer drug
developer,42 the Hatch-Waxman Act provided for extension of the pioneer’s
patent term beyond the twenty-year baseline to account for regulatory delays
that occur during drug development.43 In this way, the Act “struck a balance
between two competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research
and development of new drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring lowcost, generic copies of those drugs to market.”44
In addition to the bioequivalence requirement, an ANDA applicant
must certify one of the following four criteria with respect to each patent
that covers the pioneer drug
32. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-371R, Drug Pricing: Research on
Savings from Generic Drug Use 4 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf.
33. See Virgil Dickson, Reform Update: Generic Drugs’ High Prices Spur Fears of Failed
Drug Adherence, Modern Healthcare (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
article/20141009/NEWS/310099962.
34. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
35. E.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013).
36. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984).
37. Hatch-Waxman Act § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–92 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)
(2012)).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).
39. Id.
40. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(3) (2014).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8). See generally Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA):
Generics, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevel
opedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/
(last updated Sept. 18, 2014).
42. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, 548 F.3d 103, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
43. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(b), 156(a)(4) (2012).
44. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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that such patent information has not been filed [with FDA],
that such patent has expired,
. . . the date on which such patent will expire, or
that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted . . . .45

Paragraph I and II certifications are for drugs without patent protection. If
the applicant makes a paragraph III certification, the ANDA will be approved upon patent expiration.46
If an ANDA applicant makes a paragraph IV certification that the patent
is invalid—that is, not in compliance with the patent laws—or would not be
infringed by the ANDA product, the statute provides an intricate framework
for resolving the dispute. First, the generic firm must notify the pioneer of
the paragraph IV certification.47 Then, the pioneer can sue the generic firm
for patent infringement.48 If the pioneer sues for patent infringement within
forty-five days, the FDA must delay approval of the generic firm’s ANDA for
thirty months to allow for the resolution of the litigation.49 If the pioneer
does not sue for patent infringement within that forty-five day period, the
generic firm can sue the pioneer for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or noninfringement to obtain certainty before entering the market.50
Consequently, “patent litigation is an integral part of a generic drug company’s business,”51 and the number of challenges to pioneer patents by generic firms is on the rise.52
The Hatch-Waxman Act created a reward for generic firms that challenge pioneer patents, thereby incurring litigation costs and risking liability
for patent infringement. Specifically, the Act provides a 180-day generic exclusivity window for the first ANDA filer that challenges a pioneer patent
with a paragraph IV certification and prevails in the ensuing litigation.53 As
Senator Hatch explained, “[i]n order to give an incentive for vigorous patent
challenges, the 1984 law granted a 180-day head start over other generic
drug firms when the pioneer firm’s patents failed or were simply not infringed.”54 This 180-day exclusivity window begins when the first filer enters
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
46. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii); see H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 46 (1984) (“[I]mmediate
competition should be encouraged.”).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
50. Id. § 355(j)(5)(C).
51. AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 14-696-GMS, 2014 WL 5780213, at *7
(D. Del. Nov. 5, 2014).
52. Ed Silverman, Sue Me, Sue You Blues: More Generic Patent Litigation is Being Filed,
Wall St. J. (Nov. 5, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2014/11/05/sue-mesue-you-blues-more-generic-litigation-is-being-filed/.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
54. 149 Cong. Rec. S16104 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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the market.55 The 180-day period is worth millions of dollars, vastly exceeding litigation costs.56 “In general, most generic drug companies estimate that
60% to 80% of their potential profit for any one product is made during this
exclusivity period.”57
The 180-day exclusivity period in the Hatch-Waxman Act gave rise to a
practice known as exclusivity parking, which occurs when a first filer that
otherwise could enter the market refrains from doing so, usually because of
an agreement with the pioneer.58 Exclusivity parking delays not only the
start of the first filer’s generic exclusivity, but also its end. This practice extends the time that the pioneer can charge monopoly prices on the drug—a
portion of which is usually paid to the first filer. Since the first filer’s exclusivity starts only after the first filer enters the market,59 the first filer retains
almost the full economic benefit of its generic exclusivity; the benefit just
comes later. Exclusivity parking occurs most frequently as a result of patent
litigation settlements.60 Generally these settlements involve a payment from
the pioneer to the first filer in exchange for a promise by the first filer to
delay marketing its generic drug for some period of time.61 These settlements are colloquially called “pay-for-delay” settlements.62
The practice of exclusivity parking upsets the balance between innovation and competition that Congress chose. Congress precisely quantified its
intended balance; it only wanted full generic competition reduced by 180
days.63 Any further delay runs counter to congressional intent.64 Additionally, pay-for-delay settlements cost consumers an estimated $3.5 billion annually65 and have drawn heavy scrutiny from the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) for possibly violating federal antitrust laws.66 While some might try to
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
56. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1560 (2006).
57. Daniel F. Coughlin & Rochelle A. Dede, Hatch-Waxman Game-Playing From a Generic Manufacturer Perspective: From Ticlid® to Pravachol®, Apotex Has Difficulty Telling Who’s
on First, 25 Biotechnology L. Rep. 525, 525–26 (2006).
58. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1998); No Parking?
USPTO Relief for Subsequent ¶ IV Filers, Sughrue Mion, PLLC (Apr. 27, 2012), http://
www.sughrue.com/resources/PublicationDetail.aspx?publication=877f6d53-1e0b-458c-bd0c4e5639fedaa1.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
60. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
61. Id. Compensation to the generic can involve more than just a cash payment. See, e.g.,
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 186 (D.R.I. 2014) (noting that the
pioneer agreed not to launch its own competing generic and allowed the first filer to sell the
drug internationally).
62. E.g., Michael L. Fialkoff, Note, Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Wake of Actavis, 20
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 523 (2014).
63. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
64. See 149 Cong. Rec. S15884–85 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (discussing the intended process of the 180-day exclusivity period).
65. FTC, Pay-for-Delay, supra note 16, at 10.
66. See infra Section II.A.
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justify pay-for-delay agreements given the high cost of drug development,
these agreements still upset Congress’s chosen policy preferences.
Congress did not foresee the problem of exclusivity parking; it was an
unintended consequence.67 In 2003, as part of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA), Congress amended
the Hatch-Waxman Act, creating six provisions under which the first filer
forfeits its 180-day exclusivity.68 Two of those forfeiture provisions—the antitrust provision and the failure to market provision—specifically targeted
the practice of exclusivity parking. In 2003, Congress utilized the only thenavailable forum for the resolution of patent disputes: litigation in federal
court.69 Today, new administrative proceedings offer an alternative solution
that is quicker and less costly than litigation.
B. New Administrative Proceedings Created by the America Invents Act
In 2011, Congress enacted the most comprehensive changes to the patent laws since 1952.70 Among other things, the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act71 (AIA) created new quasi-judicial administrative proceedings before the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), an adjudicative body within the
PTO, for a party to challenge a patent’s validity.72 These new administrative
proceedings attempt to decrease the time, cost, and uncertainty of patent
litigation by placing patent disputes before a technically competent agency
rather than a lay judge or jury.73 Two of the new proceedings are inter partes
review (IPR)74 and post-grant review (PGR).75
IPRs and PGRs are very similar to traditional patent litigation in both
procedure and substance. Any person who is not the patent owner can file a
petition for IPR or PGR,76 and the patent owner can file a preliminary response.77 This is roughly analogous to the complaint and answer phase of
67. Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1788,
1794 n.34 (2011).
68. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)–(IV) (2012)). For a more detailed discussion of the MMA’s forfeiture
provisions, see infra Part II.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000) (amended 2011).
70. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38 n.4 (2011).
71. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
72. Id. § 6 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–329 (2012)).
73. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 43–48.
74. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012). In an IPR, a patent’s validity may only be challenged
with respect to novelty, id. § 102, or nonobviousness, id. § 103, and only based on patents or
printed publications, id. § 311(b).
75. Id. §§ 321–329. In a PGR, a patent’s validity may be challenged on almost any legal
ground. Id. § 321(b).
76. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 321(a) (2012).
77. Id. §§ 313, 323.
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litigation.78 The scope of the proceeding, however, is strictly limited to questions of patent validity; IPRs and PGRs do not determine questions of patent
infringement.79 If the PTAB institutes the IPR or PGR, the parties submit
evidence and take limited discovery, including depositions.80 IPRs and PGRs
culminate in an oral hearing, similar to a trial or oral argument.81 Afterward,
the PTAB must issue a final written decision within one year of instituting
the IPR or PGR.82 Finally, like traditional litigation, the parties can settle by
joint stipulation at any time before the PTAB issues its final written decision.83 In these ways, IPRs and PGRs reduce the strain on the federal judiciary effectively by replacing certain patent validity disputes that the parties
might otherwise litigate in district court. IPRs and PGRs are not ideal for
every patent challenger, but they can be superior to litigation depending on
the circumstances.84 Unfortunately for both pioneer and generic pharmaceutical firms, the AIA’s provisions for IPRs and PGRs contain no reference to
the Hatch-Waxman Act and leave practitioners uncertain about how these
two statutes interact.
II. Current Statutory Forfeiture Provisions Are Ineffective at
Curbing Exclusivity Parking
While Congress attempted to eliminate exclusivity parking in 2003, the
practice continues largely unabated. When it enacted the MMA, Congress
rejected proposed changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s major elements.85 Instead, Congress retained the basic Hatch-Waxman framework and created
several forfeiture provisions designed to make the original framework operate more effectively.86 For example, the first filer forfeits its exclusivity if the
patent in question expires,87 if the first filer amends its ANDA to no longer
78. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
79. See infra notes 149–150 and accompanying text.
80. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.51–42.65 (2014); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37. This discovery, however,
is limited. See infra notes 167–170 and accompanying text.
81. 37 C.F.R. § 42.70 (2014).
82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316 (a)(11), 326(a)(11) (2012). This timeframe is shorter than in traditional patent litigation. See infra notes 160–166 and accompanying text.
83. 35 U.S.C. §§ 317, 327.
84. See infra Section III.A.
85. See Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 Food & Drug L.J. 287,
309–13 (2004). For example, Senator Hatch advocated giving the 180-day market exclusivity to
the first successful challenger rather than the first ANDA filer. Examining the Senate and House
Versions of the “Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act”: Hearing on S. 1 and H.R. 1
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2–3 (2003) (statement of Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
86. See Shashank Upadhye, There’s a Hole in My Bucket, Dear Liza, Dear Liza: The 30Year Anniversary of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Resolved and Unresolved Gaps and Court-Driven
Policy Gap Filling, 40 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1307, 1326 (2014).
87. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI) (2012) (“All of the patents as to which the applicant
submitted a certification qualifying it for the 180-day exclusivity period have expired.”).
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challenge the patent,88 or if the first filer withdraws its ANDA entirely.89 Two
additional provisions targeted exclusivity parking90: the antitrust provision
and the failure to market provision. The effect of these provisions, however,
has been marginal at best.91 Section II.A explains why the antitrust provision
and antitrust actions generally fail to curtail exclusivity parking. Section II.B
explains why the failure to market provision has similarly failed.
A. The Antitrust Provision is Ineffective at Curbing Exclusivity Parking
“Pay-for-delay” settlements have attracted antitrust scrutiny from the
FTC since they became more common in the early 2000s.92 Naturally, when
Congress enacted the MMA, it wanted the first filer to lose its exclusivity if a
court found the agreement illegal.93 The antitrust provision results in forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity when, in an action brought by one of the
antitrust agencies, a court finds the pay-for-delay agreement violates the antitrust laws.94 While fairly straightforward, this provision, and antitrust litigation generally, have proven ineffective at combating exclusivity parking.
First, plaintiffs face an uphill battle to prove a pay-for-delay settlement
violates the antitrust laws. In FTC v. Actavis in 2013, the Supreme Court
held that pay-for-delay settlements—even those within the scope of a valid
patent—are not per se legal and could be subject to antitrust scrutiny.95
Many view the Actavis decision as a victory for antitrust plaintiffs because
cases are more likely to go beyond the motion to dismiss stage.96 The implications of Actavis, however, still make these cases very difficult for plaintiffs
88. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(III) (“The first applicant amends or withdraws the certification
for all of the patents with respect to which that applicant submitted a certification qualifying
the applicant for the 180-day exclusivity period.”).
89. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II) (“The first applicant withdraws the application or the [FDA]
considers the application to have been withdrawn as a result of a determination by the [FDA]
that the application does not meet the requirements for approval . . . .”).
90. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 1102, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–60 (2003) (codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)–(VI) (2012)); 149 Cong. Rec. S16104–05 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (praising the conference committee for adopting statutory language
meant to curb exclusivity parking).
91. See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 Hastings L.J. 171 (2008).
92. Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1788,
1794 (2011).
93. See 149 Cong. Rec. S15884 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
Interestingly, Congress did not outright ban pay-for-delay settlement agreements, but rather
tied their legality to the antitrust laws.
94. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
95. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
96. Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, FTC, Remarks at the Concurrences Journal Annual Dinner 3 (Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Remarks of Wright], http://www.ftc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/documents/public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-cases/130926act
avis.pdf.
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to win. Specifically, the Court held that plaintiffs must prove their case
under a “rule of reason” analysis.97 The rule of reason employs an overall
balancing of harms, benefits, and alternatives to decide whether the challenged agreement is illegal.98 A rule of reason antitrust case will involve complex economic questions about the market in which the defendant operates,
the scope of the defendant’s power or influence in that market, and how
much and to what extent consumers are harmed by the defendant’s conduct
compared with potential efficiencies of or justifications for the defendant’s
conduct.99 Unlike pay-for-delay cases after Actavis, other types of antitrust
cases employ burden-shifting, presumptions, or rules of per se illegality,
which make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail.100
Rule of reason cases are hard for plaintiffs to win generally,101 and payfor-delay cases will likely prove particularly difficult. Even before Actavis,
pay-for-delay settlements often contained provisions that appeared to mask
their underlying anticompetitive effects, making an antitrust case difficult to
prove.102 After Actavis, settlements will likely become more complex, making
it difficult for plaintiffs to articulate the distinct anticompetitive effects of
the agreements.103 For example, some settlements have involved forgiving
past liability in previous disputes between the same parties but involving
different drugs.104 Furthermore, post-Actavis plaintiffs will need more economic evidence of anticompetitive harm than simply the size of the payment
for delay.105 Unfortunately, evidence of market effects will be difficult to obtain. Pay-for-delay settlements, “by their very structure and the fact entry
has not yet occurred, [mean that] courts typically will be unable to measure
the actual effect of the settlement on prices at trial.”106
Second, the Actavis Court did not provide a clear framework for evaluating pay-for-delay settlements under the rule it announced: “We therefore
97. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2236.
98. 7 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1500 (3d ed.
2010).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1911c (3d ed. 2011).
101. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 830 (2009) (finding that defendants won 99 percent of all rule of
reason cases between 1999 and 2009).
102. See Amanda P. Reeves, Muddying the Settlement Waters: Open Questions and Unintended Consequences Following FTC v. Actavis, 28 Antitrust, no. 1, Fall 2013, at 9, 10.
103. Remarks of Wright, supra note 96, at 11; see Reeves, supra note 102, at 12 (suggesting
the settling companies will include joint development provisions and a desire for patent certainty among their procompetitive reasons for a pay-for-delay arrangement).
104. E.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 384 (D.
Mass. 2013).
105. Remarks of Wright, supra note 96, at 9–10; e.g., In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No.
3:12-cv-02389 (PGS), 2014 WL 4543502, at *19–21 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014).
106. Remarks of Wright, supra note 96, at 14. For a summary of post-Actavis pay-fordelay antitrust litigation, see Melissa Lipman, Law360’s Pay-for-Delay Cheat Sheet for 2015,
Law360 (Jan. 25, 2015, 8:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/608357/law360-s-pay-fordelay-cheat-sheet-for-2015.
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leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”107 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts took particular issue with
the majority’s failure to provide guidance to lower courts: “Good luck to the
district courts that must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the
‘likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances.’”108 This
leaves many questions unanswered and leaves antitrust plaintiffs unable to
predict how their cases might unfold.109 The difficulty in winning a rule of
reason pay-for-delay antitrust case combined with uncertainty after Actavis
means later-filing generic firms lack a predictable and reliable way to break
the logjam created by the first filer’s parked exclusivity.110
Third, the FTC will not scrutinize most pay-for-delay settlements. Although the FTC has publicly stated its intention to continue aggressively
enforcing the antitrust laws in pay-for-delay situations,111 the FTC’s resources are limited; it cannot pursue every pay-for-delay settlement.112 Since
2004, the number of pay-for-delay settlements has slowly risen.113 Today, the
FTC estimates that approximately thirty settlements each year take on a payfor-delay character.114 Despite these increasing numbers, only two FTC payfor-delay suits are currently pending.115 If the threat of FTC action were an
effective deterrent to pay-for-delay agreements, one would expect the number of pay-for-delay settlements to be on the decline.
Finally, fighting the rule of reason battle without clear guidance draws
out litigation for extended periods of time.116 For example, the FTC filed suit
107. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013).
108. Id. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2231 (majority opinion)).
109. Remarks of Wright, supra note 96, at 15–16.
110. Reeves, supra note 102, at 14–15; see Fialkoff, supra note 62.
111. Remarks of Wright, supra note 96, at 7–8.
112. See Reeves, supra note 102, at 14.
113. Bureau of Competition, FTC, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade
Commission Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2013, at 4 (2014), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commissionunder-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/141222mmafy13rpt-1.pdf.
114. Id. This number is based on the settlement agreements that parties are required to
submit to the FTC. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173 §§ 1112–1113, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–63 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D) (2012)).
115. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights 3 (July 23, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-chairwomanedith-ramirez-pay-delay-settlements/130923pfdopeningstatement_0.pdf. The cases are, (1) the
Supreme Court’s Actavis decision remanded back to the Northern District of Georgia, FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-955-TWT, 2014 WL 1600331 (N.D. Ga. April 21, 2014), and (2)
FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
116. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 675,
692 (2010) (noting that the average antitrust case today takes six years from filing to
disposition).
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against a pioneer company in 2008,117 and the court ruled on summary
judgment motions over six years later.118 As of March 2015, the litigation
that resulted in Actavis, initially filed in 2009, is scheduled to complete discovery in mid-2016.119 Antitrust actions are unlikely to be instituted by the
FTC, but even when they are instituted, they are difficult to win and lengthy
to resolve. The combination of plaintiffs’ difficulty prevailing in rule of reason cases, the uncertainty after Actavis, the lack of FTC resources, and the
long duration of antitrust litigation, make antitrust actions, and the corresponding forfeiture provision, ineffective at curbing exclusivity parking.120
B. The Failure to Market Provision Is Ineffective at Curbing
Exclusivity Parking
With the failure to market provision, as with the other MMA forfeiture
provisions, Congress intended to retain the overall structure of the HatchWaxman Act, but incentivize the first filer to use its exclusivity or lose it.121
The result, however, is a poorly drafted nuanced web of “earlier than” and
“later than” language that, when formally applied, leaves a pioneer and first
filer almost completely in control and able to thwart Congress’s goals.122 The
provision provides for forfeiture if
[t]he first applicant fails to market the drug by the later of—
(aa) [a date determined by the first filer’s submission and final approval dates]; or
(bb) with respect to the first applicant or any other applicant . . . the
date that is 75 days after . . . at least 1 of the following has
occurred:
(AA) In an infringement action . . . or in a declaratory judgment action . . . a court enters a final decision from which no
appeal . . . has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or
not infringed.

117. FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21, 22 (D.D.C. 2008).
118. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 527. For a summary of FTC actions in the field, see
Markus H. Meier et al., Health Care Division, Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission, Overview of FTC Antitrust Actions in Health Care Services and
Products (2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/hcupdate.pdf.
119. Consent Order Modifying Schedule at 2, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00955TWT (N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2015), ECF No. 330.
120. While a private antitrust suit cannot trigger forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)
(2012), it could potentially act as a deterrent to pay-for-delay settlements. Private antitrust
actions must still proceed under the rule of reason, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237
(2013), and are likely to take several years as well. Crane, supra note 116, at 692.
121. 149 Cong. Rec. 31,200 (2003) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (“If it forfeits, then the
exclusivity is lost and any other generic applicant that is ready to be approved and go to
market can go.”).
122. See Upadhye, supra note 86, at 1325.
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(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment action . . . a court signs a settlement order . . . that includes a
finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed.123

The statute provides for forfeiture for failure to market upon the later of
two events: an event pursuant to subpart (aa) (a “submission/approval
event”) or an event pursuant to subpart (bb) (a “litigation event”).124 While
the submission/approval event is a straightforward date determination based
on the first filer’s ANDA submission and final approval dates, the litigation
event depends on the ensuing litigation triggered by “the first applicant or
any other applicant.”125 This flexibility in the statute means that any paragraph IV ANDA filer can trigger the litigation event for the first filer, unpark
the exclusivity, and force the first filer to either enter the market within
seventy-five days or forfeit the 180-day exclusivity period. Using this provision, another generic firm can force the first filer to use it or lose it.
The flexibility of the litigation event combined with the overall “later
than” framework of the provision initially left an important question unanswered: How long does the FDA wait to decide whether another generic firm
might trigger a litigation event? The FDA’s answer: as long as the occurrence
of a litigation event is a “possibility,” forfeiture is not triggered.126 The FDA
has not expanded upon what exactly “possibility” means, except that actual
pending litigation with another generic firm is not required.127 Thus, the
failure to market provision triggers only upon the occurrence of both a submission/approval event and a litigation event.128
The seemingly indefinite length during which a litigation event can occur leaves the failure to market provision almost entirely within the control
of the parties. By settling the litigation, the pioneer and first filer avoid the
first possible litigation event—an event that falls within item (bb)(AA)—
because there is no final judgment on the merits. If that settlement contains
no stipulation of the patent’s invalidity or noninfringement, the parties
avoid the second possible litigation event—an event that falls within item
(bb)(BB)—unless a later filer initiates litigation against the pioneer. Consequently, the failure to market provision lacks any real teeth,129 and the FDA
acknowledges this loophole:
123. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I). For a more detailed discussion of the failure to market
provision, see David E. Korn et al., A New History and Discussion of 180-Day Exclusivity, 64
Food & Drug L.J. 335, 371–82 (2009).
124. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
125. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb) (emphasis added).
126. Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation
and Research, FDA, to Marc A. Goshko, Exec. Dir., Teva N. Am. 5–6 (Jan. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Granisetron Letter], www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/07n0389/07n-0389-let0003.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4–5.
129. Chad A. Landmon & Jay B. Sitlani, FDA Removes Teeth from Exclusivity Forfeiture, IP
Law360 (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.axinn.com/media/article/101_CALJBS-ip360-FDA%20
Removes%20Teeth.pdf.
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Inherent in the structure of the “failure to market” forfeiture provisions is
the possibility that a first [filer] would be able to enter into a settlement
agreement with the [pioneer] or patent owner in which a court does not
enter a final judgment of invalidity or non-infringement (i.e., without a
[litigation] event . . . occurring), and that subsequent applicants would be
unable to initiate a forfeiture with a declaratory judgment action. This inability to force a forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity could result in delays in
the approval of otherwise approvable ANDAs owned by applicants that
would market their generic drugs if they could but obtain approval. This
potential scenario is not one for which the statute currently provides a
remedy.130

Furthermore, the use of declaratory judgment actions by later-filing generic firms is ineffective at curbing exclusivity parking. First, the later filer
lacks the same incentive as the first filer to litigate any patents covering the
drug in question. Even if the later filer prevails in a declaratory judgment
action, the later filer does not obtain the lucrative 180-day exclusivity.131 Although incurring similar risks and costs, the only benefit to the later filer
from a successful declaratory judgment action would be earlier market entry. But the later filer would still be competing with all the other generic
firms now able to enter the market.132
Second, a later-filing generic firm pursuing a declaratory judgment action faces a battle just to establish standing. Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.”133
To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must show injury, a causal
connection between the injury and the defendant, and likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable court action.134 In the context of patent disputes, a declaratory judgment plaintiff used to be required to show
“reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.”135 This required showing “(1)
acts of [the patent owner] indicating an intent to enforce its patent; and (2)
acts of plaintiff that might subject it or its customers to suit for patent infringement.”136 In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,137 the Supreme Court
clarified the scope of Article III standing for declaratory judgment actions in
130. Granisetron Letter, supra note 126, at 5 n.6 (emphasis added).
131. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (2012) (“If all first [filers] forfeit the 180-day exclusivity
period . . . no applicant shall be eligible for a 180-day exclusivity period.”).
132. See Avery, supra note 91, at 193. To be sure, later-filing generics still have significant
incentives to enter the market. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., No. 2014-1282,
2015 WL 1423624, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (“If the judgment issues, there is every
likelihood that [the pioneer and first filer] will lose substantial revenues, and [the later filer]
will gain substantial revenues.”).
133. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
134. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
135. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated
by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
136. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
137. 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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patent suits and rejected the reasonable apprehension test.138 Subsequent
court decisions have made it easier for later filers to establish standing,139 but
the standard remains unsettled.140 For example, the Federal Circuit recently
held that a generic firm that has begun testing its drug but not yet submitted
an ANDA to the FDA lacks Article III standing.141
A more recent case likely puts this issue to rest. In Apotex, Inc. v. Daiichi
Sankyo, Inc.,142 the Federal Circuit allowed a later-filing generic firm to pursue a declaratory judgment action of noninfringement against the pioneer
for a patent that the pioneer disclaimed—that is, legally surrendered.143 The
court acknowledged that a declaratory judgment of noninfringement would
trigger the failure to market provision for the first filer.144 The court held
that the economic consequences of exclusivity forfeiture and the later filer’s
earlier market entry created a case or controversy, despite the fact that the
pioneer could never sue the later filer (or anyone else for that matter) for
infringement of the patent in question.145
The rationale of Apotex v. Daiichi will likely extend to a later filer that
successfully employs an IPR or PGR. After an IPR or PGR that invalidates a
patent (and after affirmance on appeal), the pioneer can no longer sue for
infringement. This has the same effect as disclaiming the patent: the property right no longer exists.146 Furthermore, the same sizeable economic
stakes will likely be in play. Consequently, a later-filing generic firm may be
able to establish Article III standing to obtain a declaratory judgment of
invalidity or noninfringement after an IPR or PGR invalidates a pioneer
patent.147
138. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11; see also Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk
Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 505 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court in MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., rejected our ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test for declaratory judgment
standing and held that the proper test is whether ‘there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127)).
139. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., No. 2014-1282, 2015 WL 1423624 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (holding exclusivity parking sufficient injury to satisfy Article III standing
for later filer’s declaratory judgment action); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc.,
527 F.3d 1278, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same). But see Janssen Pharm., N.V. v. Apotex, Inc.,
540 F.3d 1353, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Caraco and holding later filer’s stipulation of patent validity, infringement, and enforceability failed to create adequate
controversy).
140. Matthew Avery & Mary Nguyen, The Roadblock for Generic Drugs: Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction for Later Generic Challengers, 15 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 1, 18 (2013).
141. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 773 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
142. Apotex, 2015 WL 1423624.
143. Id. at *14.
144. Id. at *9.
145. Id. at *4.
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 253(b) (2012) (allowing a patent owner “to disclaim or dedicate [the
patent] to the public”).
147. See Apotex, 2015 WL 1423624, at *4–14.
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III. Modifying the Failure to Market Provision to Include IPRs
Though well-intentioned, the MMA’s forfeiture provisions remain ineffective at curbing exclusivity parking. The newly created quasi-judicial administrative proceedings before the PTAB offer an alternative process for
challenging a patent’s validity, and thus can and should also trigger the failure to market provision. Because courts and the FDA are unlikely to interpret the failure to market provision as including the new PTAB proceedings,
however, a statutory change is required to achieve that inclusion. Section
III.A describes how IPRs and PGRs present alternative forums for challenging the validity of a pharmaceutical patent. Section III.B argues that courts
and the FDA are unlikely to construe the failure to market provision to include IPRs or PGRs in light of the statutory language. Section III.C proposes
an amendment to the failure to market provision that would accommodate
IPRs and PGRs and argues that this amendment is faithful to congressional
intent.
A. IPRs and PGRs: The Alternative Forum to Patent Litigation
Although IPRs and PGRs bear striking similarities to litigation,148 certain differences will alter their attractiveness to a generic firm that wants to
challenge a pioneer patent. First, the scope of IPRs and PGRs is limited
strictly to issues of patent validity; IPRs and PGRs cannot be used to determine questions of infringement.149 Thus, a generic firm that intends to claim
that its product does not infringe the pioneer patent and that the pioneer
patent is invalid might choose to keep all its claims in a single district court
rather than fight on two fronts.150
Second, IPRs and PGRs have different standards of proof than traditional litigation. A declaratory judgment plaintiff needs only a “short and
plain statement” showing the party is entitled to relief.151 To successfully
institute an IPR or PGR, the challenger must show a “reasonable likelihood”
of success,152 or “that it is more likely than not” that the petitioner will
prevail,153 very similar to the standard for a preliminary injunction.154 Thus,
IPRs and PGRs require more initial work than a complaint for declaratory
judgment and contain a higher probability of early failure.155 Once the IPR
148. See supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text.
149. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 321(b) (2012).
150. See Eric S. Walters & Colette R. Verkuil, Patent Litigation Strategy: The Impact of the
America Invents Act and the New Post-Grant Patent Procedures, Practical Law Co. 6 (2012),
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120307-Patent-Litigation-Strategy.pdf.
151. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
152. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
153. Id. § 324(a).
154. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits.”).
155. It should be noted, however, that a later filer would likely spend significant resources
evaluating a patent’s validity in advance of filing an IPR or declaratory judgment action.
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or PGR is instituted, however, a generic firm must prove invalidity by only a
preponderance of the evidence156—a lower standard than the “clear and
convincing” standard a district court requires to overcome the patent
owner’s statutorily mandated presumption of validity.157 While some commentators suggest standards of proof are amorphous and highly subjective,158 a subtle difference in the standard of proof could be dispositive in
some patent cases.159
Third, IPRs and PGRs are often shorter than patent litigation. According to a recent study, the median time to trial in patent litigation is two-anda-half years.160 By contrast, an IPR or PGR is statutorily required to conclude
within twelve months.161 The PTAB decides whether to institute an IPR or
PGR within six months of the filed petition, resulting in a maximum eighteen-month start-to-finish timeline for IPRs and PGRs.162 This faster timeline could prevent courts from hearing issues too late to afford the relief
sought.163 Furthermore, given their shorter duration and more limited
scope, IPRs and PGRs are estimated to cost a challenger $300,000 to

156. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e).
157. Id. § 282(a), construed in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246
(2011).
158. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 Vt. L. Rev. 469, 470
(2009) (suggesting it is “contestable” that a fact finder assigns the appropriate probability for a
given standard of proof); cf. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (finding the
difference between the Administrative Procedure Act’s “substantial evidence” standard and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)’s “clearly erroneous” standard is “subtle” and that the
Federal Circuit “overstate[d] the difference that a change of standard will mean in practice”).
159. See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-681, 2013 WL 286251, at *9–10
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2013) (holding defendant failed to prove invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence), rev’d in relevant part by a divided panel, 754 F.3d 952, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
160. Chris Barry et al., PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2014 Patent Litigation
Study: As Case Volume Leaps, Damages Continue General Decline 16 (2014), http://
www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-study.
pdf.
161. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316 (a)(11), 326(a)(11). The PTAB can extend this twelve-month period by an additional six months for “good cause.” Id.
162. A patent owner’s preliminary response must be filed within three months of the
petition, 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (2014), and the PTAB must decide whether to institute the IPR or
PGR within three months of the preliminary response, 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(b), 324(c).
163. E.g., Merck & Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 292 F. App’x 38, 41 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal for lack of standing under MedImmune) (“Even with prompt action by
this panel, the final judgment sought by Apotex cannot be provided in time to be
meaningful.”).
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$500,000,164 while patent litigation can cost several million dollars.165 Ultimately, a generic firm would be well advised to carefully consider the full
implications of its particular situation before pursuing an IPR or PGR.166
Fourth, the scope of discovery available to the parties in an IPR or PGR
is much more limited than in a district court action. In an IPR, discovery is
limited to deposing witnesses who submitted affidavits or declarations and
“what is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”167 In a PGR, “discovery shall be limited to evidence directly related to factual assertions advanced by either party in the proceeding.”168 By contrast, in district court
“any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense” is
generally discoverable.169 Thus, IPRs and PGRs might be attractive to generic
firms that wish to challenge a pioneer patent on only a specific and narrow
ground, making additional discovery unnecessary.170 Whether a generic firm
will find an IPR or PGR suitable will depend on its individual
circumstances.171
Many patent challengers already utilize these new proceedings, and their
popularity is quickly growing.172 Patent challengers are on pace to file nearly
2,000 IPRs in fiscal year 2015.173 In the biochemistry/organic chemistry field,
patent challengers are on pace for approximately 150 IPRs in fiscal year
2015.174 Although these figures fall short of the nearly 6,500 total patent
lawsuits filed in district courts in 2013175 (approximately 260 of which were
filed pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act),176 it remains to be seen how
prominent a role PTAB proceedings will play in the resolution of patent
disputes, particularly Hatch-Waxman disputes. Additionally, in December
164. Tom Engellenner, Comparison of Federal Court, ITC, and USPTO Proceedings in IP
Disputes, AIPLA 31 (Jan. 2014), http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Prac
tice-in-Japan/Committee%20Documents/2014%20MWI%20Presentations/Tom%20Engellen
ner%20-%20IP%20Dispute%20Cost%20Comparison.ppt.
165. Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, 2013 Report of the Economic Survey, http:/
/www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/2013aipla%20survey.pdf.
166. Walters & Verkuil, supra note 150, at 7.
167. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5).
168. Id. § 326(a)(5).
169. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
170. Walters & Verkuil, supra note 150, at 4.
171. For example, small entities could be at a disadvantage in the “complex procedural
web” of the new PTAB proceedings. Mark Consilvio & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Unraveling the
USPTO’s Tangled Web: An Empirical Analysis of the Complex World of Post-Issuance Patent
Proceedings, 21 J. Intell. Prop. L. 33, 36–37 (2013).
172. See USPTO, AIA Progress Statistics, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/
aia_trial_statistics.jsp (last updated Mar. 19, 2015).
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Barry et al., supra note 160, at 5.
176. Brian C. Howard & Jason Maples, Lex Machina, Hatch-Waxman/ANDA Litigation Report 3 (2014).
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2014 the PTAB issued its first set of final written decisions in a pharmaceutical patent dispute that could otherwise be the subject of Hatch-Waxman
litigation.177 The patent owner prevailed,178 and the challenger did not appeal the PTAB’s decision.179 Thus, neither the FDA nor a court has addressed
how an IPR or PGR final written decision interacts with the failure to market provision.180
B. IPRs and PGRs Are Unlikely to Fall Within the Failure
to Market Provision
Whether the failure to market provision extends to IPRs and PGRs is
fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation. Adopting an inclusive
interpretation would be consistent with the broad scope of estoppel that
attaches to IPRs and PGRs and would effectuate the same result as a legislative change. Given the language of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the AIA,
however, neither the FDA nor a court is likely to adopt an inclusive interpretation, especially in a highly regulated field.
1. The Language of Both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the AIA Strongly
Supports an Exclusive Construction
The plain text of the failure to market provision does not support including IPRs or PGRs within its scope. The statute’s triggering event is a
determination of noninfringement or invalidity from “an infringement action or a declaratory judgment action.”181 Neither an IPR nor a PGR is an
infringement action; IPRs and PGRs determine questions of patent validity,
177. Aaron Vehling, PTAB Backs 3 Oracea Patents in 1st-Ever Pharma AIA Ruling, Law 360
(Dec. 10, 2014, 2:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/603169/ptab-backs-3-oracea-patents-in-1st-ever-pharma-aia-ruling; see Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No.
IPR2013-00368, 2014 WL 6998034, at *8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (holding challenged patent
claims not invalid); Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00371, 2014
WL 6998035, at *8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (same); Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm.,
Inc., No. IPR2013-00372, 2014 WL 6998115, at *8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (same). None of
these decisions appear docketed for appeal in the Federal Circuit.
As of March, 2015, four pharmaceutical IPRs settled before the PTAB issued a final written decision: IPR2013-00012, IPR2013-00015, IPR2013-00024, and IPR2014-00160. Fourteen
pharmaceutical IPRs are due for final written decisions in 2015: IPR2014-00115, IPR201400325, IPR2014-00360, IPR2014-00376, IPR2014-00377, IPR2014-00378, IPR2014-00379,
IPR2014-00549, IPR2014-00550, IPR2014-00652, IPR2014-00654, IPR2014-00656, IPR201400784, and IPR2014-00876. Numerous pharmaceutical IPRs are pending and awaiting PTAB
action in 2016.
178. Amneal, 2014 WL 6998034, at *8; Amneal, 2014 WL 6998035, at *8; Amneal, 2014
WL 6998115, at *8.
179. Most appeals take nine to twelve months. Median Disposition Time for Cases Decided
by Merits Panels, U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/Statistics/med%20disp%20time%20merits_chart.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
180. See Matias Ferrario et al., The Use of Inter Partes Review Petitions in ANDA Litigation,
ABA (Aug. 4, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles/
summer2014-0814-use-inter-partes-review-petitions-anda-litigation.html.
181. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB) (2012).
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not patent infringement.182 Thus, the issue would be whether IPRs or PGRs
are “declaratory judgment actions.” The statute frequently uses the term
“declaratory judgment” with specific reference to the Declaratory Judgment
Act,183 suggesting that the term should not be broadened to include IPRs or
PGRs.184 Although IPRs, PGRs, and infringement actions all originate pursuant to title 35,185 declaratory judgment actions originate pursuant to title
28.186 The explicit references to title 28 in the failure to market provision
strongly suggest that neither IPRs nor PGRs fall within the plain meaning of
the forfeiture statute.187
The backdrop against which the MMA-enacting Congress legislated
supports excluding IPRs and PGRs from any judicial or agency construction
of the forfeiture statute. When Congress enacted the MMA in 2003, a third
party could challenge the validity of an issued patent in two other PTO administrative proceedings: “ex partes reexamination”188 and “optional inter
partes reexamination.”189 Congress did not include these older proceedings
in the MMA forfeiture provisions in 2003.190 Thus, the MMA-enacting Congress presumably intended for only litigation to trigger forfeiture. It is also
possible, however, that this was a simple oversight.
Next, the IPR and PGR statutes do not support an interpretation that
either proceeding is a “declaratory judgment action.” Sections 315 and 325
of title 35 frequently use the words “proceeding” and “matter” to reference
the IPR or PGR, while referring separately to “civil actions.”191 There is no
reference in the IPR or PGR statutes to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the MMA,
or any other related statute that would suggest an IPR or PGR triggers the
failure to market provision—a provision that existed in 2011 when Congress
created IPRs and PGRs. This clear delineation between litigation and administrative proceedings strongly suggests that Congress did not intend the two
to be interchangeable.
The presence of another provision in the AIA, separate from the IPR
and PGR provisions, supports excluding IPRs and PGRs from the failure to
market provision. Section 12 of the AIA, though not directly related to IPRs
182. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 321(b) (2012). Infringement of patents is governed by
§§ 271–273 of title 35.
183. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012).
184. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(i)(I) (“No action may be brought under section 2201 of
title 28 . . . for a declaratory judgment . . . .”); id. § 355 (j)(5)(C)(i)(I) (same).
185. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271–273, 311–319, 321–329.
186. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.
187. See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the plain meaning of “civil action” in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) excludes administrative
proceedings).
188. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307.
189. Id. §§ 311–319.
190. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)–(IV) (2012)).
191. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315, 325.
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or PGRs, specifically references litigation pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman
Act.192 Thus, the AIA-enacting Congress presumably legislated with full
awareness of the Hatch-Waxman Act and was capable of amending the forfeiture provisions to include the new PTAB proceedings, but chose not to.193
Furthermore, because IPRs and PGRs are different from declaratory judgment actions,194 Congress arguably could have wanted it to be easier to invalidate patents generally, but not easier to trigger forfeiture of exclusivity for
pharmaceutical patents. Although this too was probably an oversight by
Congress in a complex area of law, a court or the FDA would be unlikely to
adopt an inclusive interpretation in light of the powerful textual arguments
available.
2. Neither a Court nor the FDA Would Be Likely to Adopt an Inclusive
Construction of the Failure to Market Provision
The strongest arguments for an inclusive construction flow from the
broad estoppel effect of IPRs and PGRs. After an IPR or PGR, a patent
challenger “may not assert . . . that the [patent] claim is invalid on any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” during
the IPR or PGR.195 This estoppel attaches to any future PTO proceeding,
action before the International Trade Commission, or declaratory judgment
action,196 and an IPR or PGR final decision is only appealable directly to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.197 The estoppel also operates in
reverse: if the patent challenger files for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, the challenger may not pursue an IPR or PGR.198 In effect, the AIA
directly replaced certain types of declaratory judgment actions with IPRs
and PGRs to reduce the amount of patent litigation.199 Without the estoppel
attached to IPRs and PGRs, litigation in district court might not be reduced.
Interpreting the forfeiture provision to exclude IPRs and PGRs could
lead to an unusual result—an IPR or PGR final decision of invalidity affirmed on appeal could actually prevent the challenger from triggering a forfeiture event.200 If neither the PTAB’s final decision nor the Court of
192. Id. § 257(c)(2)(A) (“Paragraph (1) shall not apply to . . . a notice received by the
patent owner under . . . the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . .”).
193. See 157 Cong. Rec. S5405 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(“Congress certainly should not expect nor allow mistakes by the bureaucracy to up-end the
rights and provisions included in the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).
194. See supra Section III.A.
195. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e).
196. Id.
197. Id. §§ 319, 329.
198. Id. §§ 315(a)(1), 325(a)(1). This form of estoppel does not apply if the declaratory
judgment action is a counterclaim to an infringement action. Id. §§ 315(a)(3), 325(a)(3).
199. See supra Section I.B.
200. See H. Keeto Sabharwal & Dennies Varughese, How Inter Partes Review Impacts
Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity, Law360 (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/417119/
how-inter-partes-review-impacts-hatch-waxman-exclusivity.
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Appeals’s decision falls within the bounds of the forfeiture statute, the prevailing patent challenger would be forced to go back to a district court to
obtain a consistent declaratory judgment pro forma—to the extent that the
case is not moot—to trigger forfeiture.201 But, as described above, the challenger is estopped from bringing the action and may not even have a justiciable case or controversy.202
Arguing for a broad statutory construction would not be unprecedented
in this context, but would likely be unsuccessful. In Sullivan v. Hudson,203 the
Supreme Court construed the phrase “civil action” in a fee-shifting statute
to include related administrative proceedings because the administrative
proceedings were “intimately tied to the resolution of the judicial action and
necessary to the attainment of the results Congress sought to promote.”204
An IPR or PGR by a later-filing generic firm might meet these two criteria.
Not only is the IPR or PGR “intimately tied” to a potential co-pending district court action, but the IPR effectively replaces it.205 Also, using an IPR
effectuates the results that the MMA-enacting Congress sought to promote.
Congress envisioned that “[u]nder the failure to market provision, the conditions for forfeiture [would] be satisfied when a generic company has resolved patent disputes on all the patents that earned the [first filer] its
exclusivity.”206 Due to the estoppel that attaches to IPRs and PGRs, an invalidity ruling from the PTAB resolves the patent dispute, thereby satisfying
the condition Congress thought sufficient to trigger forfeiture and force the
first filer to enter the market. The analogy to Sullivan v. Hudson fails, however, because neither an IPR nor PGR is a necessary condition to resolve the
patent dispute; it is simply a sufficient one. A patent challenger can choose
whether to file a declaratory judgment action or a PTAB proceeding. Both
lead to a resolution of the dispute, but neither one is necessary to resolve the
dispute.
A later-filing generic firm that prevails in an IPR or PGR could petition
the FDA to determine whether the PTAB’s decision falls within the language
of the forfeiture provision. If the FDA adopts an interpretation that excludes
IPRs and PGRs from the statutory language, the later filer would face a tremendous obstacle if a reviewing court affords the FDA Chevron deference
for its interpretation.207 The FDA has a track record of strictly interpreting
201. See id.
202. Id. But see, infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.
203. 490 U.S. 877 (1989).
204. Sullivan, 490 U.S. at 888. But see Schindler v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 29 F.3d 607, 609–11 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (construing the phrase “civil action” to exclude a
probate proceeding, even though the construction would lead to double recovery contrary to
congressional intent).
205. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
206. 149 Cong. Rec. S15885 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Senator Kennedy)
(discussing the intended purpose of the failure to market provision).
207. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). When a
court reviews an agency interpretation of law, it first asks if Congress has directly spoken to the
question at hand. If not, then the court simply inquires if the agency’s interpretation is a
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the Hatch-Waxman Act.208 For example, the FDA interpreted a different part
of the failure to market provision209 to effectively allow a pioneer to “pull the
rug” out from under the first filer by removing the patent from the FDA’s
official list of patents on approved drugs, triggering forfeiture of the first
filer’s 180-day exclusivity.210 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned the FDA’s interpretation, determining that removal of a patent from
the FDA’s official list only triggers forfeiture if done by court order, rather
than by the voluntary act of the pioneer.211 The FDA also strictly interpreted
one of the MMA’s other forfeiture provisions: the “failure to obtain tentative
approval” provision.212 Under this provision, the exclusivity is forfeited if the
first filer “fails to obtain tentative approval . . . within 30 months after . . .
the [ANDA] is filed, unless the failure is caused by a change in or a review of
the requirements . . . imposed after . . . the [ANDA] is filed.”213 This provision was designed to prevent generic firms from quickly filing poor quality
ANDAs in order to obtain the 180-day exclusivity when final approval might
come several years later.214 Initially, the FDA construed the second half of
the provision (excusing a delay stemming from a change in review requirements) in a “very narrow and draconian” fashion.215 Applying an expressio
unius argument, the FDA stated:
reasonable one. Id. at 842–43. A recent Federal Circuit case suggests the FDA would receive
Chevron deference. See Apotex, Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., No. 2014-1282, 2015 WL 1423624,
at *9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (“[The parties] do not suggest that, were a non-infringement
judgment to issue [to the later-filer] in this case, the FDA would nonetheless consider it inadequate to trigger forfeiture of [the first filer]’s exclusivity period based on a restrictive view of
the forfeiture provisions that is entitled to judicial deference.” (emphasis added)).
208. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1317–18 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. For Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, to ANDA Applicant 8–9 (Oct. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Dorzolamide Letter], http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CenterforDrugEvaluationandResearch/uc
m119602.pdf; Granisetron Letter, supra note 126, at 5–6.
209. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC) (2012).
210. Teva, 595 F.3d at 1305. The FDA’s official list of patents that protect approved drugs
is colloquially called the “Orange Book.” FDA, Orange Book: Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations: Publications, http://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/scripts/cder/ob/eclink.cfm.
211. See Teva, 595 F.3d at 1317.
212. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV).
213. Id. Section 1133 of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act,
Pub. L. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993, 1122 (2012), extended this thirty-month period to forty
months for some applications and thirty-six months for others to allow the FDA to process a
backlog of ANDAs, US FDA Extends Timeline for Generic Drug Approval, BioSpectrum (last
updated Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.biospectrumasia.com/biospectrum/news/121139/us-fdaextends-timeline-generic-drug-approval.
214. See Upadhye, supra note 86, at 1326.
215. Kurt R. Karst, OGD Management Review Results in Forfeiture of Generic ACTONEL
180-Day Exclusivity Eligibility, FDA L. Blog (Sept. 1, 2014, 4:34 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.
net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2014/09/ogd-management-review-results-in-forfeiture-ofgeneric-actonel-180-day-exclusivity-eligibility-.html.
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This express description of the circumstances in which exclusivity will not
be forfeited for failure to obtain tentative approval makes it clear that,
under other circumstances in which an applicant has failed to obtain tentative approval, regardless of what party might be responsible for that failure,
the first applicant will forfeit exclusivity.216

The FDA’s hard-line stance has been dubbed “our failure is your failure.”217
Although the FDA has been lenient in some circumstances,218 the FDA remains committed to this position.219
Finally, pharmaceuticals are a highly regulated industry, and courts usually defer to Congress and agencies in such instances.220 Congress has spoken
frequently and recently in matters related to pharmaceutical approval and
patent disputes: the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, the America Inventors Protection Act of 1999,221 the MMA in 2003, and the AIA in 2012. Furthermore,
the “balance between incentives . . . for innovation[ ] and . . . for quickly
getting lower-cost generic drugs to market” is “quintessentially a matter for
legislative judgment, [and] the court must attend closely to the terms in
which the Congress expressed that judgment.”222 Thus, an amendment to
the statute by Congress is the only workable solution.223
C. Using IPRs and PGRs to Trigger Forfeiture Would Likely Require
Congressional Action
Because neither a court nor the FDA is likely to construe the failure to
market provision to include IPRs and PGRs, statutory change is required to
bring IPRs and PGRs within the failure to market provision. Amending the
216. Dorzolamide Letter, supra note 208, at 9 (emphasis added).
217. Karst, supra note 215.
218. See e.g., Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, to Marcy Macdonald, Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Sandoz, Inc. 2–3
(Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/
040445s000ltr.pdf (determining exclusivity not forfeited when drug’s labeling requirement remained under review); Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation and Research, FDA, to Nicholas Tantillo, Senior Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Barr Labs.,
Inc. 2 (July 30, 2009), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2009/
078104s000ltr.pdf (declining to determine if a first filer forfeited exclusivity until another applicant becomes eligible for approval); Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. For Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, to Stephen Auten, Vice President, Sandoz, Inc. 9 (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2010-P-0632-0017 (determining exclusivity was not forfeited when first filer chose to change drug’s formulation from a sealed glass
ampule to a stoppered glass vial).
219. See Memorandum from Robert L. West, Deputy Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, FDA,
to ANDA 079215, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA (June 10, 2014), http://www.fdalawblog.net/ACTONEL%20-%20180-Day%20Exclusivity%20Forfeiture%20FDA%20Letter%20Decision.pdf.
220. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142–45 (2000); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
221. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-113 app. I, 113 Stat.
1501A–521.
222. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
223. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 155–56.
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failure to market provision would remove uncertainty from a field in which
so much is at stake, and an appropriate amendment would further the goals
of both the Hatch-Waxman framework and the AIA. Adding the following
italicized words to the failure to market provision at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) would effectuate this result:
In an infringement action brought against that applicant with respect to
the patent or in a declaratory judgment action brought by that applicant
with respect to the patent or in an administrative proceeding with respect to
the patent, a court or agency enters a final decision from which no appeal
(other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has
been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or not infringed.224

First, this amendment would provide greater procedural certainty for
later filers that wish to unpark a first filer’s exclusivity. Utilizing an IPR or
PGR avoids potential uncertainty concerning standing in a declaratory judgment action and the uncertainty of how to prove a pay-for-delay rule of
reason antitrust violation. More to the point, this amendment would confirm that IPRs and PGRs can be used to trigger forfeiture under the failure
to market provision. Uncertainty, especially in the pharmaceutical industry,
can cause huge fluctuations in stock prices, making business executives and
investors particularly anxious.225
Second, this amendment would further the goals of the Hatch-Waxman
Act as amended by the MMA. This amendment would assure later filers that
their successful IPR or PGR will unpark a first filer’s exclusivity, consistent
with Congress’s intent.226 For some generic firms, this amendment would
provide a preferable alternative to litigation as a way of triggering forfeiture.
Ultimately unparking the first filer’s exclusivity facilitates Congress’s original
goal of getting cheaper drugs to consumers via full competition after the
first filer’s exclusivity elapses.227
Third, this amendment would further the goals of the AIA. The AIAenacting Congress wanted to remove some patent disputes from district
courts and put them in front of a more technically competent agency.228 If
an IPR or PGR of a pharmaceutical patent lacks the effect of a declaratory
judgment action for Hatch-Waxman purposes, neither first filers nor later
224. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012). Although this Note proposes legislative change, a court or agency decision that adopts an inclusive interpretation would effectuate
the same result.
225. See John Osborn, Supreme Court Punts on Pay For Delay, But Will Generic Filings
Under Hatch-Waxman Decline?, Forbes (June 26, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/johnosborn/2013/06/26/will-the-supreme-courts-opinion-on-patent-settlements-detergeneric-filings-under-hatch-waxman/ (discussing the business and economic harms from patent uncertainty in the litigation context).
226. See 149 Cong. Rec. S15885 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Senator
Kennedy).
227. See supra notes 58–69 and accompanying text.
228. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38–40 (2011).
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filers will pursue the new PTAB proceedings. Consequently, pharmaceutical
patent disputes will remain in district courts.
Other options for reducing exclusivity parking remain viable, but involve more sweeping change. For example, Congress could legislatively modify Actavis to afford the FTC (and private parties too, potentially) greater
leverage in fighting pay-for-delay settlements under the antitrust laws.229 Another option would be to reduce the ability of the pioneer to market its own
“authorized generic” which competes with the first filer during the 180-day
exclusivity period, depriving the first filer of its full reward.230 Yet another
option would be to tie the 180-day exclusivity to the first generic firm to
prevail in court, rather than the first to submit its ANDA to the FDA.231
These options, however, propose a similar kind of overhaul to the one the
MMA-enacting Congress rejected.232 Significantly reforming these statutes
risks unintended consequences.
This proposed amendment is by no means a complete fix to the exclusivity parking problem. As mentioned, IPRs and PGRs can be settled,233
meaning that later-filing generic firms could use IPRs as leverage to extract
their own settlements from the pioneer companies. While settlements that
do not unpark the first filer’s exclusivity do not to lead to timely full competition, the prospect of paying off multiple later filers might incentivize the
pioneer and first filer to refrain from entering into a pay-for-delay settlement in the first instance.
Furthermore, this proposed amendment allows a first filer to defeat a
pioneer patent more quickly and more cheaply. If it were easier to defeat a
pioneer patent, Congress should reduce the length of the exclusivity for first
filers that defeat pioneer patents in an administrative proceeding; less “reward” would be needed for less expense and risk, and full generic competition could occur sooner.
This amendment is a modest change and a good first step. It would
clarify one ambiguity in a complex statutory scheme without overhauling
the basic regulatory process. This amendment advances the goals of both the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the AIA and contains a relatively low risk of unintended consequences. Exclusivity parking itself was an unintended consequence of major reform, so Congress should proceed cautiously with even
moderate reforms. This specific, narrow amendment can be done now.
Conclusion
Patents incentivize pioneer drug developers to search for treatments for
medical conditions and help offset the substantial cost of ensuring new
229. See Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative Approach,
41 Rutgers L.J. 83, 94–96 (2009).
230. See id. at 97–99.
231. See id. at 99–103.
232. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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drugs are both safe and effective. Greater patent protection fuels innovation
for life-saving drugs, but at the cost of some affordability. With the HatchWaxman Act, Congress struck a balance between innovation and competition. The practice of exclusivity parking upsets that balance. Although some
scholars argue that the 180-day exclusivity period should not be used as a
way to effectuate greater generic competition,234 it is the mechanism Congress has chosen and reaffirmed.235
Congressional efforts to close the loopholes that allow exclusivity parking have proven marginal at best. Antitrust plaintiffs face a multiyear uphill
battle to prevail in rule of reason cases and significant uncertainty about
courts’ receptiveness to various types of evidence and arguments. Similarly,
the MMA’s poorly drafted failure to market provision has proven toothless
for later filers attempting to unpark a first filer’s exclusivity with declaratory
judgment actions.
New administrative proceedings before the PTAB offer an alternative
solution. Under the present statutory language, however, these new proceedings will likely prove ineffective for later-filing generic firms at triggering the
failure to market provision. Neither a court nor the FDA is likely to adopt a
broad enough construction of the failure to market statute to accommodate
the new PTAB proceedings. Thus, amending the failure to market provision
to include administrative proceedings would remove the uncertainty in the
field and help return the Hatch-Waxman Act to its originally intended
balance.

234. See Upadhye, supra note 86, at 1325–26 n.70 (noting that other countries without a
generic exclusivity period maintain a robust generic drug industry base and that exclusivity is
“not a necessary predicate to generic drug development”).
235. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
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